When Public Sector Workers Unionize by Casey Ichniowski
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: When Public Sector Workers Unionize
Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski, eds.




Chapter Title: Public Sector Union Growth and Bargaining Laws : A Proportional
Hazards Approach with Time-Varying Treatments
Chapter Author: Casey Ichniowski
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7902
Chapter pages in book: (p. 19 - 40)1  Public Sector Union Growth 
and Bargaining Laws : 
A Proportional Hazards 
Approach with Time-Varying 
Treatments 
Casey Ichniowski 
1.1  Introduction 
Entering the 1960s, few public sector employees were organized. By 
1984, approximately  36  percent of all government employees in  the 
United States were members of unions (Freeman 1986,41). For certain 
occupational groups, particularly  the protective  services, collective 
bargaining establishes salaries and working conditions for the vast ma- 
jority of departments in  the United  States (Freeman  1986, 46). This 
explosion in public sector unionism has occurred while private sector 
unionization has declined dramatically. It also coincides with the pas- 
sage of state laws that provide various degrees of protection of public 
employees’ rights to organize and to bargain collectively. The role that 
these laws play in the growth of public sector unionism is the central 
focus of this study. 
1.2  Previous Research and Current Methodology 
Largely because the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) extends across  most  areas  of  private  sector  employment, 
econometric investigations of the relationship between policy variables 
and union growth using private sector data are necessarily very limited. 
The most convincing studies are perhaps case studies of groups that 
were at various times covered by the NLRA; for example, supervisors 
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in the Foremen’s Association of America in the late 1930s and early 
1940s (see Ross  1965, 260-62),  or agricultural workers in the United 
Farm Workers  in California in the late 1960s (see Kushner 1975). In 
contrast, the public sector provides a better laboratory for examining 
the linkages between public policies and union growth because of the 
extreme variation  in  public  sector collective  bargaining  laws across 
states and occupational groups. Despite this, there have been few in- 
vestigations  of  the  relationship  between bargaining  laws  and union 
growth in the public sector, and those studies tend to focus on union- 
ization among teachers.’ 
The studies also rely on aggregate state-level data and therefore suffer 
from three limitations. The state-level percent-organized  or percent- 
covered measures used as dependent variables are affected not only 
by the formation of new units, but  also by subsequent employment 
effects  of  collective  bargaining.  If, as has been recently  suggested, 
public  sector unions  increase employment as well  as compensation 
levels through their influence on the budget-setting process (Freeman 
1986, 52), then percent-organized statistics may increase from relative 
increases in manning after departments unionize as well as from the 
formation of new bargaining units. The limited evidence on this point 
in fact supports the proposition concerning  positive employment  effects 
of public unions (Zax 1985). A second difficulty associated with using 
state-level percent-organized variables as  the dependent variable is that 
these state-level  percent-organized  variables  give  equal  weight  to a 
given percentage increase in unionization in different states, even though 
the same percent increase represents very different numbers of bar- 
gaining units and covered employees from state to state. For example, 
a given percentage  increase in  New Hampshire’s percent organized 
may correspond to the formation of only a very small number of bar- 
gaining units covering relatively few employees, while in California the 
same percentage increase may mean a very large number of new units 
were formed. Third, state-level  analyses cannot provide  any infor- 
mation on the kinds of municipalities  that are more or less likely to 
enter bargaining relationships with unions in their departments. 
In contrast to this earlier work, in this study I focus on collective 
bargaining at the municipal level, which is normally the level at which 
bargaining units are formed for most public sector occupations. I use 
the data to follow the unionization history of approximately  1,000 mu- 
nicipal police departments with differing characteristics under various 
state laws.  Unlike  with  most  state-level  studies, which  use  cross- 
sectional data and can only document whether unionization tends to 
be higher in states that have laws,2  here I take a longitudinal perspective 
and ask whether or not the legislation is necessary to permit growth 
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1.2.1  Model Specification: Proportional Hazards Framework 
With municipal-level data, more appropriate specifications than have 
been previously employed can be developed. Specifically, I model the 
process of bargaining unit formation as a duration study that asks “what 
determines the length of time that will pass before a department union- 
izes?”  and I use the Cox proportional hazard (PH) model to analyze 
the data. Let Y,  measure the number of  years municipality  i remains 
nonunion; AY) is the probability density function of this duration vari- 
able; F(Y) is the cumulative probability function; and H(Y) = AY)/ 
(1 - F(Y)),  the hazard function that describes the rate of  transition 
from nonunion to union status. The PH model assumes multiplicative 
effects of the independent variables according to: 
(1)  H(Y) =  H(Y)exp(XB) 
where X  is a vector of municipal and state-level characteristics that 
affect the decision to unionize. The PH model assumes no specific form 
for the underlying hazard rate function H(Y). The X  variables cause 
parallel shifts in H(  Y).3 
1.3  Data and Variable Definitions 
1.3.1  Dependent Variables: Post-Law Duration and Nonunion 
Duration 
The likelihood function that describes transitions into unionization 
for each city and town is generated from a duration variable,  Yi.  To 
calculate Yi,  I use responses to two questions to a 1979 survey con- 
ducted by Freeman, Ichniowski and Lauer (1985): (1) Does your city 
have a written labor contract covering wages, hours and conditions of 
employment for police personnel?; and (2) What  year  was  the first 
written labor contract signed?. I assume that cities with contracts have 
been party to a contract since the year given in the response to the 
second question. This information covers approximately  1,000 munic- 
ipalities with populations  above  10,000 that  report municipal police 
employment in the Municipal Yearbook in 1978 (International City Man- 
agement Association  1978). Police associations that do not bargain for 
written agreements are considered nonunion. From these survey ques- 
tions, I construct two different measures of the duration of nonunion 
status. 
The first variable, post-law nonunion duration (PLDUR), is defined 
as the number of  years a city remains nonunion in different legal en- 
vironments. If laws affect union status, PLDUR will be smaller in the 
presence than in the absence of a law, and smaller the stronger the law. 
Because many states do not have laws and because the duration variable 22  Casey Ichniowski 
is censored for cities that do not unionize, there are some complications 
in  measuring  PLDUR. For cities  in  states with laws, there are two 
components to the PLDUR measure-the  value of PLDUR after a law 
is passed, and the value for PLDUR before the law is passed. For the 
period after passage of the law, PLDUR is either: (I) “year unionized- 
year of law”  for cities that unionize; or (2) “1979-year  of law”  for 
cities that do not unionize. For the period prior to the passage of the 
laws, PLDUR is either: (1) “year of law-1958’’  for cities that do not 
unionize in the pre-law  environment, where 1958 is the year that the 
first state bargaining law for police was enacted; or (2) “year unionized- 
1958” for cities that unionize before the law was enacted. For cities in 
states without laws, PLDUR is: “year unionized-  1958” for cities that 
unionize, or, for cities that never unionize, “1979-1958.”  By defining 
the duration variable  this way,  I  can contrast unionization  in  three 
different environments: in states with a law before and after passage 
of the law, and in states that never passed a law. Table  1.1 summarizes 
how PLDUR is defined. 
There are two elements of arbitrariness in this definition.  First, I 
chose 1958 as a starting year for calculating nonunion durations, even 
though  I could have chosen earlier years. Second, for cities that do 
not unionize by  1979, I censor PLDUR at 1979. These two decisions 
should result  in an understatement of the number of years a city is 
nonunion in an environment without a law and thus bias the estimated 
effects of the laws downward. That is, had I chosen a year earlier than 
1958 as a starting point, the values of PLDUR for cities in environments 
without laws would be even larger. Moreover, with no particular spurt 
in police unionization in states without laws since 1979, the number of 
years that cities remain nonunion in these environments has increased 
Table 1.1  Constructing Estimates of Post-law Nonunion Duration (PLDUR) 
Law and Unionization Situation  Definition of PLDUR 
In states that pass laws: 
After law is passed for cities that unionize 
after law 
After law is passed for cities that never 
unionize 
Before law is passed for cities that do not 
unionize in the pre-law environment 
Before law is passed for cities that unionize 
before the law 
year unionized -  year of  law 
1979 -  year of law (censored) 
year of law - 1958 (censored) 
year unionized -  1958 
In states that never passed a law: 
Cities that unionize 
Cities that never unionize 
year unionized -  1958 
1979 -  1958 (censored) 23  Union Growth and Bargaining Laws 
since 1979. One reason why this definition could cause an overstate- 
ment of the effects of the laws on unionization is that PLDUR is mea- 
sured from a starting year of  1958 for cities in states that never enacted 
a law, while in  states that did pass a law, the component of  PLDUR 
for the period after the law is passed is measured from a starting year 
that is later than  1958. This would result  in  an upward  bias on the 
estimated effects of the laws, if, as seems likely, the climate for public 
sector unionization improved over time. However, adding a control 
variable that measures the year that a law is enacted (YRLAW) will 
adjust for this  bias.  By  defining PLDUR as beginning in  1958 and 
including the LAWYR control variable, the analysis should understate 
the effects of  laws on unionization rates. 
While analysis of the PLDUR duration variable is designed to give 
understated point estimates of the effect of the law variables on union- 
ization  rates,  there  is an important  limitation on this  analysis. The 
LAWYR control variable is undefined for all no-law observations, and 
is  set to zero for these observations. When the definition of one co- 
variate control variable (LAWYR) directly depends on another covar- 
iate (the dummy law  variables), the  significance of  the  law  dummy 
variables cannot be determined. Because methods for testing the sig- 
nificance of the parameters on the law variables have not been devel- 
oped, I estimate several other specifications. First, I analyze a sample 
with all  no-law observations deleted. This addresses a more  limited 
question: within the set of cities that have a law, how do different laws 
affect unionization rates from the date the law is enacted? Since all no- 
law  observations  are deleted  from  the  sample (including the  set of 
censored pre-law observations corresponding to the no-law experience 
of cities that are eventually covered by a law), LAWYR is defined for 
all observations in the restricted sample. One can therefore test whether 
the effect of  one kind of law on unionization is significantly different 
from that of a different law. 
To extend formal significance testing in a limited fashion to the anal- 
yses of  the entire sample of municipal observations, I  also estimate 
models of duration of nonunion status using a second duration variable: 
nonunion duration (NUDUR), which equals the number of years a city 
remains nonunion after 1955. Again, if a municipality remains nonunion 
through 1979, the last year of the period being analyzed, the NUDUR 
variable is censored. 
There are several limitations on interpreting parameters on bargain- 
ing law variables when NUDUR is the dependent variable. This analysis 
compares municipalities that were never covered by a bargaining law 
and those that unionized prior to the enactment of a law, with munic- 
ipalities that did not unionize prior to the law’s enactment in  states 
with laws. It tests whether municipalities in the latter group unionized 24  Casey Ichniowski 
more or  less  rapidly  after the  1955 baseline  year,  even though  the 
relevant  statutes were  generally  enacted  well after  1955. Estimated 
parameters on the law variables will therefore underestimate the effect 
of bargaining laws on police unionization.  Still, one can test the sig- 
nificance of these underestimates because the definition of NUDUR is 
the same for cities with and without laws, and because there is no other 
covariate whose definition directly depends on the law dummy vari- 
ables. Note, however,  that when LAWYR is added to the NUDUR 
models, it is not possible to perform formal significance testing of the 
law parameters. Also, including LAWYR in NUDUR models serves a 
conceptually different purpose than it does in PLDUR models. That 
is, for observations with laws, NUDUR includes the pre-law years in 
the dependent duration variable. Thus, where LAWYR is greater, cities 
have been exposed to the law for less time, implying that the probability 
of unionization will be lower if laws increase unionization. In NUDUR 
models,  the  parameters  on  LAWYR  should  therefore  be  negative, 
whereas  if  the  climate  for police  unionization  improved  during  the 
period under consideration, its coefficient in the PLDUR models should 
be positive. 
In summary, the PLDUR models yield point estimates of the effects 
of  different  laws,  but  to formally test  the  significance of  estimated 
effects of laws the models must be reestimated with samples restricted 
to municipalities in states that passed laws. By contrast, the NUDUR 
models are estimated for the entire sample of municipal observations. 
1.3.2  Bargaining Laws: The Timing and Substance of Time-Varying 
Treatments 
In this paper I consider two aspects of  state collective bargaining 
laws as potential determinants of union status: the extent to which the 
law encourages collective bargaining, and the extent to which the law 
contains impasse procedures that ensure closure of the bargaining pro- 
cess. My control group consists of states with no collective bargaining 
laws.4 
In the case of bargaining laws I distinguish between bargaining per- 
mitted (BP) laws that permit but do not obligate employers to bargain 
with employees, and duty-to-bargain (DTB) laws that require employ- 
ers to bargain with employees. Bargaining permitted laws often state 
that employees have some weak form of rights “to meet and confer 
with”  or “to present proposals to” their employers. Duty-to-bargain 
laws place affirmative obligation on employers to bargain with repre- 
sentatives and thus are more likely to induce unionization. 
A DTB provision does not, however, ensure closure to the bargaining 
process.  In the private sector, the strike threat forces negotiators to 
evaluate impasses and ultimately moves the parties to some resolution 25  Union Growth and Bargaining Laws 
of differences in their positions. But, except in very rare circumstances, 
police  strikes are illegal in  the  United  States. One can imagine an 
employer in a DTB environment bargaining but not conceding to any 
union demands since the strike threat may be significantly dampened 
for these public employees. By 1978, fourteen states had enacted some 
form of compulsory interest arbitration statutes for police negotiations. 
These environments form another law category (ARB). Under such 
statutes, police labor organizations need not rely on the final consent 
of the public employer to determine the terms and conditions of their 
employment, but rather a neutral third party has power to arbitrate 
contract terms. If employees believe that interest arbitration produces 
higher wage settlements, employees would be more likely to organize 
in these environments. The limited empirical evidence that exists on 
the impact of arbitration on salaries provides some evidence for such 
an effect (Olson 1980; Feuille and Delaney 1986). In any case, as long 
as employees perceive the potential for such an impact of arbitration, 
it would encourage unionization. 
1.3.3  Other Covariates 
While there is no comprehensive theory of union growth that clearly 
identifies other variables  that might also influence unionization  pro- 
pensities, previous  empirical studies on union growth and represen- 
tation  elections  can  be  used  to  identify  characteristics  of  police 
departments and municipalities that might also sect  unionization. First, 
since bargaining laws and policies are defined along state boundaries, 
it is important to incorporate other state characteristics as controls. 
State-level controls include four geographic region dummy variables 
(northeast, north central, south and west), the percentage of state’s 
nonagricultural  work force who are public employees,  and the per- 
centage of a state’s private sector nonagricultural work force that is 
unionized. The region controls and the percent-union variable will in- 
dicate how favorable the climate is toward unionization. If patterns of 
public sector unionization parallel those in the private sector, one would 
expect greater public sector unionization for northeastern and north 
central cities and lower unionization for southern cities. Similarly, the 
percent-union variable should also have a positive effect on unioniza- 
tion. By contrast, the effect of  the proportion of  a state’s workforce 
that is in  public employment  is ambiguous.  More public employees 
constitute a greater voting block likely to pressure states for favorable 
laws. But, the taxpaying public may find it more important to be rep- 
resented by public managers who will oppose unionism (and keep labor 
costs down) where there are relatively more public employees. 
Several municipal-level control variables  are available for a large 
proportion of the municipalities in the sample: population, number of 26  Casey lchniowski 
departmental employees, per capita income, per capita municipal rev- 
enue, central city dummy variable, and three government-type dummy 
variables (council-manager, mayor-council, and comrni~sion).~  The first 
two variables acknowledge the importance of unit size in the unioniza- 
tion process. In the private  sector, the most common finding is that 
unit size is negatively related to union support in certification elections 
(Rose 1972; Chaison 1973; Cooke 1983). The sign of the correlation in 
this public sector sample may be different for several reasons. First, 
the private sector samples are generally certification elections from the 
1970s or early  1980s. They  do not  include the earliest unionization 
campaigns of  the 1930s and 1940s, many of which may have had rel- 
atively large units. In contrast, this study is designed to consider the 
process of unionization among all municipalities with populations over 
10,000 from the time when virtually no municipal police department 
was organized. Also, since bureaucratization is likely to increase with 
city size, employees may need to unionize to obtain a voice in larger 
municipalities. Since population is available for a slightly larger sample 
of municipalities than is the department size variable, and since these 
two variables are highly correlated, I report results for models incor- 
porating only the population control. 
Ability-to-pay variables (revenue and income) might indicate an in- 
crease in the public employer’s ability to satisfy more of  the diverse 
interest groups, including the police department, vying for a share of 
the municipal budget.  In this way, managers in  wealthier cities and 
towns might be better able to avoid unionization. Conversely, the in- 
centive to unionize may be greater where municipal revenues are larger. 
Thus, these controls play a role similar to firm profitability in private 
sector unionization studies. The impact of profitability on unionization 
rates in bargaining-unit-level studies has received little attention in the 
existing private sector studies6 
Central cities may be associated with relatively high area wages, a 
greater degree of private sector unionization, and perhaps more haz- 
ardous duties for the police. If these forces make police more likely to 
consider unionization, this variable will cause an upward shift in the 
union hazard function. Finally, different governmental structures might 
affect the responsiveness of  an employer to employee desires, so that 
certain governmental structures might be more highly correlated with 
the probability of municipal unionism. 
While a number of these controls vary over the period considered, 
it is necessary to assume that the rankings of municipalities along the 
dimensions of the controls are reasonably stable over the period (Law- 
less 1980, 383-94).  For example, one must assume that relatively pop- 
ulous cities at the start of  the period still rank high in  population by 
the end of the period examined. It is also necessary to assume that 27  Union Growth and Bargaining Laws 
unionization of a municipality’s police department does not affect that 
city’s relative ranking along the dimensions of the control variables 
(e.g., if a relatively wealthy suburban town organizes in the early 1960% 
it  is  still relatively  wealthy  by  the end  of  the period).  While  these 
assumptions may be more problematic for some controls (particularly 
the revenue variables) than for others (such as central city status or 
government type), these state and municipal characteristics may  be 
correlated with the locus and rate of police unionization and with state 
bargaining laws. Therefore, they are potentially important controls that 
help guard  against  overestimating  the impact  of  bargaining laws on 
union transition probabilities. 
1.4  Empirical Results 
Table 1.2 summarizes the basic data that underlie the analysis and re- 
ports the percentages of municipalities that unionized before and after 
enactment of various laws. For each of the law categories, columns 1 
and 2 record the number of states that enacted each type of law as its 
first bargaining law and the number of municipalities in those states with 
data on their police departments’ collective bargaining contract status. 
Column 3 shows that states that enacted a BP, DTB and an ARB law as 
their first bargaining law had 65.0  percent, 87.8 percent and 96.2  percent 
of their police departments organized by  1978. In column 4, one ob- 
serves that very little of  this unionization occurred prior to the enact- 
ment of these laws. Only  12.7 percent of the 622 municipalities that 
unionized did so prior to the enactment of the law. (Any such munici- 
palities are categorized as no-law municipalities in the PH analysis, since 
they did not remain nonunion past the time of the enactment of the law.) 
Columns 5  and 6 show that a considerable proportion of  the police 
unionization in states with laws occurred within the first few years of 
the enactment of a law. This is particularly true for states that had a DTB 
or an ARB law as their first statute. In those states 52.7 percent and 
58.4 percent of  all unionization occurred within the first six years of 
the law, where the year in which the law was enacted is counted as one 
of these six years (column 6). Of  those municipalities that remained 
nonunion  until  after  a  law  was  passed  (column  2 - column  4), 
9.7 percent were unionized in BP states, 53.0 percent were unionized in 
DTB states, and 69.3 percent were unionized in ARB states over the 
first six years of the initial bargaining law. In sharp contrast, throughout 
the entire period under consideration, only 9.7 percent of  the 237 mu- 
nicipalities in states that never enacted a law had unionized. 
This simple analysis, while highlighting sharp differences between po- 
lice unionization rates in the presence and absence of laws, may be mis- 
leading for several reasons. States with laws may have municipalities Table 1.2  Timing of Unionization Relative to F’assage  of Bargaining Laws 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Type of  First  Number Organized  Number Organized  in First Three  in First Six 
Bargaining Law  Number of  by 1978  Years of Law  Years of  Law  Pre-Law 
(# of states)  Municipalities  (as % of col. 2)  (as % of  col. 3)  (as % of col. 3)  (as % of col. 3) 
Number Organized  Number Organized 
For states with 
a law (34) 
BP (10)  374  243  15  12  35 
DTB (16)  229  20  1  29  50  106 
ARB (8)  185  178  35  74  104 
Subtotal  788  622  79  136  245 
(65.0%)  (6.2%)  (4.9%)  (14.4%) 
(87.8%)  (14.4%)  (24.9%)  (52.7%) 
(96.2%)  (19.7%)  (41.6%)  (58.4%) 
(78.9%)  (12.7%)  (21.9%)  (39.4%) 
-  -  For states that  237  23  23 
never  (9.7%)  (lOO.O%) 
enacted a law 
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that are more prone to unionization. Post-law unionization occurs later 
in the period under consideration, so that the effects of an improving 
climate for police unionization must be sorted out before attributing the 
patterns in table 1.2 to an effect of the laws. 
To formalize the analysis, I estimate the principal PLDUR PH model. 
Of the 1,025 municipalities that have police contract data, 793 have a 
full set of data on all covariates. Since more than one observation per 
municipality is included in the sample for any municipality that remains 
nonunion past the time of the enactment of a law, the total number of 
observations in the sample for the analysis, N  = 1,359, is greater than 
793. 
Column 1 of table 1.3 presents the complete set of parameters from 
the PLDUR PH model. Since the magnitudes of the p parameters are 
affected by  the units of  measurement for the independent variables, 
the relative  magnitudes of  the various  p’s  do not gauge the relative 
importance of the covariates. Column 2 of Table 1.3 presents the means 
and standard deviations of the covariates for the N  = 793 sample. (The 
N  = 793 sample is used to calculate sample characteristics instead of 
the N  = 1,359 sample since the latter includes more than one obser- 
vation  for certain municipalities and, therefore, would  not  give an 
accurate picture of the average municipality.) Column 3 calculates for 
the dummy variables in the model the quantity exp[p]. This calculation 
yields the ratio of  the union hazard rate for a municipality with the 
given characteristic and one without it (all other covariates the same). 
Column 4 presents the relative increase in the union hazard rate that 
would result from a one standard deviation increase in a given covar- 
iate. This is given by exp[p(i + u,)]/exp[pi].  These calculations in- 
dicate that the nature of  the bargaining law is the most important factor 
in influencing unionization rates. 
Specifically, lines la, lb, and lc of column 3 show that the relative 
unionization propensity of a municipality is raised dramatically by any 
of  the bargaining laws. Compared to no-law environments,  relative 
unionization propensities are: 15.0  times greater in ARB environments, 
13.3 times greater in DTB environments, and 4.2 times greater in BP 
environments. The magnitude of  the effects of laws calculated in this 
way shows an even more dramatic effect of laws than the simple anal- 
ysis of table 1.2. Moreover, the calculations in column 4 which compare 
the magnitude of  the effects of  the bargaining laws to the effects of 
other covariates, underscore the conclusion drawn by Saltzman (1985, 
345) in  his  state-level analysis of teacher unionism-that  bargaining 
laws  are  the  single  most  important  deterimant  of  public  sector 
unionization. 
Among other covariates, there are significant effects associated with 
the  degree  of  private  sector  unionization  in  the  state,  the  region Table 1.3  The Impact of Bargaining Laws, State Characteristics, and Municipal characteristics on Police Unionization 
(1)  (2)  (3)"  (4)b 
Relative Increase in 
Means and  Unionization Probability  from a one standard 
Relative Increase in  Unionization Probability 
P-parameters and  (standard deviations)  from 0 to I  increase  deviation increase 
Covariates  (standard errors)  of  Covariates  (dummy variables)  (all variables) 
1.  Bargaining laws 
a. ARB 
b. DTB 
c.  BP 
2.  LAWYR 
3.  Region 
a.  northeast 
b. central 
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Nores: "significance  tests not performed on parameters for law dummy variables 
"calculated by exp[p] 
bcalculated by exp[p(x + uJ/exp(p.d 
"'two-tailed  p-value < .OIx 
**two-tailed  p-value < .05 
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variables,’ and central city status. The insignificant impact of the pop- 
ulation variable does not necessarily contradict the observation that 
the largest cities in the United States are more likely to have unionized 
police departments. Central city status and population are highly cor- 
related so that with a central city variable in the equation, population 
has no effect on the propensity to unionize. While the city income and 
revenue variables both have positive parameters, neither is judged to 
be significant. 
1.4.1  Additional PH Models 
While the magnitude of  the effects of  the bargaining laws is larger 
than that of all other covariates, formal significance testing of individual 
parameters on the law variables are not possible for the model in table 
1.3. Therefore, several additional PH models are estimated. Parameters 
on the law variables for these supporting PH models are presented in 
table 1.4. 
As a reference point, column  1 of  table  1.4 presents the estimates 
of the impact of the laws from the model in table 1.2. Column 2 gives 
estimates of the impact of the laws when NUDUR (“year of unioniza- 
tion- 1955”  for uncensored observations  and  “1979-  1955”  for cen- 
sored  observations)  is  the  dependent  variable.  In  this  analysis  an 
observation is classified according to the first legal environment it ex- 
periences while it is still nonunion. These estimates show that munic- 
ipalities  with  laws  unionized  earlier  in  the  1955-78  period  than 
municipalities in the no-law category. Since laws are usually enacted 
well into the 1955-78  period, the parameters on the law variables are, 
as expected, noticeably smaller than those obtained in column 1. While 
these parameters underestimate the effect of bargaining laws, one can 
test the significance of  each parameter relative to the omitted no-law 
comparison group. Even using these underestimates of the effects of 
the laws, the estimated parameters on the DTB and ARB variables are 
significantly different from zero, though the estimated parameter on 
the BP variable is not. 
To  illustrate  the fact that  the column 2 model underestimates the 
effects of laws because pre-law years are included in the dependent 
duration variable, I added LAWYR, the number of pre-law years, to 
the equation. The results in column 3 show that the estimated param- 
eters on the law variables increase dramatically. Again, since LAWYR 
is undefined for no-law observations, no significance testing of these 
law parameters is performed. 
To judge the significance of the effects of ARB and DTB laws relative 
to BP laws, the sample in columns 4 and 5 is analyzed. Here, all no- 
law observations are deleted from the sample, and the observations in 
the BP category are the comparison group. Whether or not LAWYR 33  Union Growth and Bargaining  Laws 
Table 1.4  The Effect of Bargaining Laws on Police Unionization: Estimates 
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Notes: Asymptotically normal standard errors in  parentheses. (a): Other controls are: 
three region dummies; percent of private sector workforce in the state that is unionized; 
percent of state workforce in public employment; two government-type dummies; central 
city dummy; population; per capita income; and per capita city revenue. 
Y3ignificance tests inappropriate on law dummy parameters in columns marked with s. 
***two-tailed p-value < .01 
**two-tailed p-value < .05 
*two-tailed p-value < .10 
is included, significance testing can be performed on the law variables, 
since LAWYR is defined for all observations in this sample. The anal- 
ysis does in fact suggest that the DTB and ARB laws increase union- 
ization rates more than do BP laws. Interestingly, once one restricts 
the sample to observations with some kind of law, the effect of LAWYR 
is  no longer judged  to be  significantly different from zero. That is, 
within the range of years that laws were enacted in the United States, 
post-law durations are not significantly shorter if the post-law duration 
begins in a later year. 
Across all models, it is also interesting to note that the effects of 
DTB and ARB laws on police unionization are not significantly  different 
from one another. Specifically, in comparing the log-likelihood statistics 
from any of the models in table 1.4 to a corresponding model in which 
DTB and ARB categories are collapsed into one variable, there is no 
significant difference in the performance of the two models. 34  Casey Ichniowski 
1.4.2  Survival Plots 
A useful way to summarize the data and to underscore the impor- 
tance of the bargaining laws is to present plots of the survival functions 
for various representative cities. Figure  1.  I  plots the probability that 
a municipality with average characteristics will be nonunion under the 
differing legal environments. These probabilities are estimated using 
the model in table  1.3 with PLDUR as the dependent variable, with 
any LAWYR effect excluded from estimates. The plots for the BP, DTB 
and ARB municipalities  begin  in  1965,  1968 and  1968, respectively. 
These years represent the average of the years in which these forms 
of bargaining law were enacted. The results are clear. No-law environ- 
ments are characterized by very little unionization. In 1979, the prob- 
ability that the average municipality would still be nonunion if  it had 
not been exposed to a law is approximately  33. Law environments 
produce unionization.  An average municipality  exposed to a BP law 
(for fourteen years), a DTB law (for eleven years), or an ARB law (for 
eleven years), has .59, ,29 and .25 probability of remaining nonunion 
by  1979. 
In figure  1.2, I  plot the probability that a municipality  having the 
average characteristics of a no-law, BP, DTB, and ARB municipality 
will be nonunion at different points in time.  Here the municipalities 
differ in characteristics across law categories as well as in the law itself. 
That the plots are quite similar to those in figure 1.1 underscores the 
fact that the legal environment, more than any characteristic, dictates 
the union hazard probabilities. The differences between the probability 
of remaining nonunion for a no-law municipality and those of  munic- 
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ences in figure 1.1. This reflects the fact that no-law cities have lower 
values of PCTUNION (percent union) and are less likely to be in the 
northeast region (both of these characteristics are positively associated 
with the union hazard function). From figure  1.2, one estimates the 
probability that an average no-law, BP, DTB and ARB municipality will 
still be nonunion in  1979 as .87, .36, .02 and .01, respectively. These 
plots depict graphically the central finding of  this  study: changes in 
unionization  rates among municipal police in  the  United  States oc- 
curred after the enactment of bargaining laws. 
1.4.3  The Pre-Law Organizers 
While the analysis documents the critical role that bargaining laws 
play in creating an environment that will allow collective bargaining to 
exist, there are cases where formal collective bargaining contracts are 
negotiated even though no law exists. To  gain further insight into the 
unionization-bargaining law  relationship, I contacted  representatives 
from municipalities that have contracts but are in states that have yet 
to enact a bargaining law. Of the 793 municipalities included in the PH 
analysis,  198 are in states that have not enacted a law.  Of  these 198 
municipalities, only 10 have negotiated contracts. However, in several 
of  these  cases, the  cities  enacted a municipal ordinance permitting 
collective bargaining, emphasizing the importance of  protective leg- 
islation to allow bargaining. In other cases, municipalities tended to 
have a strong union influence in private sector employment that made 
collective bargaining a widely accepted practice in the area. For ex- 
ample, Weirton and Huntington, West Virginia, are communities with 
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Pascagoula, Mississippi (the only municipality with a contract in a state 
in which police collective bargaining is explicitly illegal by state statute) 
has a number of  craft unions  representing workers in its  dominant 
industry, shipbuilding. Management in Pascagoula, because of the state 
law outlawing police bargaining, has the option of using the courts to 
void the contract, but has not followed this route because of the strong 
pro-union sentiment of the citizens in their town. These examples sug- 
gest channels through  which a variable  like PCTUNION influences 
police unionization rates; however, the examples also suggest that the 
state-level PCTUNION  variable  does not  adequately capture occa- 
sional strongholds of private sector unionization at the municipal level 
in states with otherwise low levels of private sector unionism. 
1.5  .Conclusion 
Using a PH framework for estimating the rate of unionization among 
municipal police departments, this study documents the critical role 
played by  the nature of  the statutory bargaining environments. The 
police bargaining laws are clearly not a result of already existing bar- 
gaining. The speed with which unionization occurs in the first few years 
after enactment of laws, particularly laws with some sort of  duty-to- 
bargain provision, does however suggest some form of pent-up demand 
for unionization.  Given the experience in  the private  sector, where 
unionism continues to decline in spite of the protections of the NLRA, 
bargaining statutes are a necessary but insufficient condition for union 
growth. Other factors specific to the public sector might help to account 
for the rapid rate of public sector unionization after bargaining laws 
were enacted. Public sector laws may be more effective safeguards of 
employees’ bargaining rights, since these laws may have stricter en- 
forcement or stiffer penalties for violations than does the NLRA in the 
private sector.*  Finally, public employers, as agents of the government, 
may be less likely than private sector employers to violate the letter 
or  spirit of a bargaining statute. 
Notes 
1. The most recent study which employs the most rigorous empirical tests 
to date is Saltzman (1985). Also see Moore (1978). 
2. The only analysis on public sector unionism that examines changes in a 
percent-organized variable is contained in Saltzman (1985, 345). However, the 
analysis does not correlate this change variable to all categories of  bargaining 
laws. 37  Union Growth and Bargaining Laws 
3. For the original exposition of the proportional hazards framework, see 
Cox (1972). More  recently, see  developments  in Kalbfleisch and Prentice  (1980). 
4. A small number of municipal observations in states that eventually enacted 
a law prohibiting police bargaining are kept in the no-law comparison group. 
5. Municipal control variables are available from International City Managers 
Association, “Master Code”  Data Tape (I.C.M.A.  1978). Government type, 
municipal revenue, per capita income population  and department size also 
appear in the published volume Municipal Yearbook, 1978 (International City 
Management Association 1978). 
6. In one review of  what have generally been industry-level studies, Bain 
(1981, 3) concludes that profit levels seem to have a positive correlation with 
union growth and labels this a “prosperity effect”. 
7. The significance of the set of region controls is judged by comparing the 
chi-square statistics for the model in table I .2  with and without the three region 
variables. 
8. For a critical review of the increase in unfair management labor practices 
and a discussion of the weakness in penalties under the NLRA, see Weiler 
(1983). 
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Comment  John M. Abowd 
In the private sector the two most important pieces of enabling legis- 
lation permitting the formation of collective bargaining units are:  (1) the 
Clayton Act exclusion of coalitions of  employees from antitrust reg- 
ulation and (2) the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regulation 
of the formation of bargaining units and imposition of a duty to bargain 
on employers. It seems inconceivable that any economist would argue 
that private sector unionism would have developed its current form or 
coverage without this protection.  I  The question of which protection is 
quantitatively more important in explaining the subsequent increase in 
private sector bargaining units is completely confounded by the unique- 
ness of the legislative actions. There is simply insufficient statistical 
variation in the legal environment to permit reliable estimation of the 
effects of these laws. 
Economists presume that private sector bargaining unit formation is 
a direct result of legal protection not afforded to other forms of col- 
lective activity. This presumption is based on a simple before and after 
comparison of bargaining  unit  formation  around the times  of  major 
changes in the legal environment. In the public sector there is also a 
John M. Abowd is  associate professor of  labor economics in the New  York  State 
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of Economic Research. 
1. This is not to argue that collective action by workers occurs only because of the 
NLRA. Collective action is the regulated activity. Its incidence and form is governed 
by  the costs and benefits of  the activity itself.  However, the position of  recognized 
bargaining units as a substantial economic force is a direct result of lowering the costs 
(protection of organizing activity) and raising the benefits (duty to bargain) that occurred 
because of the form of the regulation. 39  Union Growth and Bargaining Laws 
presumption that the widespread increase in organizing and negotiating 
activity was due to the legal protection recently granted those activities. 
Fortunately, in the public sector this presumption can be systematically 
investigated because the regulation has, for the most part, occurred at 
the state and local levels of government. The necessary statistical vari- 
ation in the legal environment is present because the various states 
acted at different times and with different types of legal protection. 
The paper by Ichniowski uses this variation in the legal environment 
to provide striking evidence that it is precisely the form of the legal 
protection of  police bargaining units that has promoted the formation 
of these units and the subsequent negotiation of collective agreements. 
Since many readers may not be familiar with the statistical techniques 
Ichniowski uses, let me summarize his simplest, but most convincing, 
results. The unit of analysis is a municipal police force. The definition 
of unionization is that a bargaining unit exists from the date of signing 
the first written collective agreement. Ichniowski is studying the time 
it takes for a bargaining unit to form in the presence of different legal 
environments:  (1) no protection,  (2)  collective  bargaining permitted, 
(3) duty to bargain, and (4) compulsory interest arbitration. The sta- 
tistical method is based  on the probability of becoming a unionized 
police force in the next year, given that the police force is not unionized 
at the start of the year.* 
From table 1.2 we can deduce that in the absence of any law there 
is about a 0.4 percent chance of a police union forming in  any given 
year. This is the base against which all comparisons are made. At this 
rate of  unionization, a police force would expect to remain nonunion 
for 250 years. We  can think of  this as forever. Turning now to table 
1.3, the effect of passing a bargaining permitted law is to increase the 
conditional probability of union formation from 0.4 percent to 1.6 per- 
cent per year. At this rate a police force would expect to remain non- 
union for sixty years. The effect of a duty-to-bargain law is to increase 
this probability from 0.4 percent to 5 percent per year. At this rate a 
police force would expect to remain nonunion for nineteen years. Fi- 
nally, the effect of passing a compulsory interest arbitration law is to 
increase the conditional probability of unionization from 0.4 percent 
to 6 percent per year. At this rate a police force would expect to remain 
nonunion for seventeen years. Since the probability of decertification 
of police unions is essentially zero, if new bargaining units form at a 
2. I  have taken certain liberties with the  statistical  terminology in order to promote 
clarity. Technically, Ichniowski studies the hazard rate, which measures this conditional 
probability in the next instant given that the union does not currently exist. The “hazard” 
here is formation of a union. This terminology has its origins in engineering and the life 
sciences, where the “hazard” is failure of a critical part or death, and leads to somewhat 
unfortunate connotations in  this study. 40  Casey Ichniowski 
rate  of  6 percent per  year,  the extent of  public  sector unionization 
would reach 27 percent in just five years. 
The statistical analysis attempts to control for the independent effects 
of location, private sector unionization, and other potential correlates 
of propensity to unionize. In order to gain some feel for the magnitude 
of the estimated legal environment effects, suppose that there were no 
public sector enabling legislation. Then, if  the extent of private sector 
unionization increased from 25 percent (the sample average) to 34 per- 
cent (one standard deviation above the sample average), the conditional 
probability  of forming a new police union  would  increase from 0.4 
percent to 0.6  percent per year. The length of time a police force would 
expect to remain nonunion would fail from 250 to 178 years. The effect 
of increasing private sector unionization is the largest estimated effect 
on the police unionization rate apart from the public sector bargaining 
law effects. 
Ichniowski’s estimated effects of changes in the legal environment 
are so large that one is compelled to ask: Are these estimates credible? 
I think the answer to this question is “yes.”  Most municipalities use 
standardized personnel policies for police officers already. The for- 
mation of  a bargaining unit, therefore, has limited benefits unless the 
police expect to win  substantial improvements in the terms of  com- 
pensation or operating procedures of the force. Without legal protec- 
tion, police officers may face nontrivial penalties for collective action- 
termination or denial of promotion, for example. With legal protection, 
unionized officers are unlikely to lose the benefits of standardized per- 
sonnel policies, so they no longer risk substantial costs when attempting 
collective action that might produce other improvements in compen- 
sation or working conditions. Therefore, it  is believable that police 
officers would attempt collective action in this low penalty environ- 
ment.  Of  course, this does not mean that they will be  successful in 
achieving gains from unionization.  The measurement of the gains to 
the police officers awaits further study. 